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APELLATE COURT JURISDICTION
Jurisdiction is proper in this Court pursuant to §78-4-103(2)(h) Utah Code
Annotated (2008).
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
David does not disagree with the statement of issues and standard of review as set
forth in Tamara's Brief
STATUTORY PROVISIONS
There are no constitutional provisions, ordinances or regulations that are
determinative of this case.
Statutes:
UTAH CODE ANN. §30-3-5(8)(a) provides:
(8) (a) The court shall consider at least the following factors in determining alimony:
(i) the financial condition and needs of the recipient spouse;
(ii) the recipient's earning capacity or ability to produce income;
(iii) the ability of the payor spouse to provide support;
(iv) the length of the marriage;
(v) whether the recipient spouse has custody of minor children requiring support;
(vi) whether the recipient spouse worked in a business owned or operated by the
payor spouse; and
(vii) whether the recipient spouse directly contributed to any increase in the payor
spouse's skill by paying for education received by the payor spouse or allowing the payor
spouse to attend school during the marriage.
(b) The court may consider the fault of the parties in determining alimony.
(c) As a general rule, the court should look to the standard of living, existing at the
time of separation, in determining alimony in accordance with Subsection (8)(a).

1
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However, the court shall consider all relevant facts and equitable principles and may, in
its discretion, base alimony on the standard of living that existed at the time of trial. In
marriages of short duration, when no children have been conceived or born during the
marriage, the court may consider the standard of living that existed at the time of the
marriage.
(d) The court may, under appropriate circumstances, attempt to equalize the parties'
respective standards of living.
(e) When a marriage of long duration dissolves on the threshold of a major change
in the income of one of the spouses due to the collective efforts of both, that change shall
be considered in dividing the marital property and in determining the amount of alimony.
If one spouse's earning capacity has been greatly enhanced through the efforts of both
spouses during the marriage, the court may make a compensating adjustment in dividing
the marital property and awarding alimony.
(f) In determining alimony when a marriage of short duration dissolves, and no
children have been conceived or born during the marriage, the court may consider
restoring each party to the condition which existed at the time of the marriage.
(g) (i) The court has continuing jurisdiction to make substantive changes and new
orders regarding alimony based on a substantial material change in circumstances not
foreseeable at the time of the divorce.
(ii) The court may not modify alimony or issue a new order for alimony to address
needs of the recipient that did not exist at the time the decree was entered, unless the
court finds extenuating circumstances that justify that action.
(iii) In determining alimony, the income of any subsequent spouse of the payor may
not be considered, except as provided in this Subsection (8).
(A) The court may consider the subsequent spouse's financial ability to share living
expenses.
(B) The court may consider the income of a subsequent spouse if the court finds that
the payor's improper conduct justifies that consideration.
(h) Alimony may not be ordered for a duration longer than the number of years that
the marriage existed unless, at any time prior to termination of alimony, the court finds
extenuating circumstances that justify the payment of alimony for a longer period of time.
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case, the Course of Proceedings and Disposition.
1.

The divorce trial came before the Honorable Anthony B. Quinn on July 27,

2009. The trial court took the matter under advisement, and entered written Findings of
Fact and Conclusions of Law on August 6, 2009. (R. 168.)
2.

Tamara appeals the trial court's award of alimony of $ 1,008.31 until the

marital home is sold and $800 after the residence has been sold, with the duration of
alimony to be for the length of the marriage (20 years and 2 months) unless terminated
earlier by Tamara5s cohabitation, remarriage or the death of either party. (R. 212.)
STATEMENT OF FACTS
1.

ThetrialcourtorderedthatDavidpaychildsupportof$l,582(R.211.)

based on the following findings:
a.

"Respondent is employed as a professor of mathematics at the University of

Utah. For the reasons stated in paragraph twenty (20) below, the Court determines his
gross monthly income to be $9,927.94. (R. 170, | 9.)
b.

"The petitioner is currently employed by Jet Blue as a reservation agent.

For child support purposes, the parties agree that her income is $1,766.32." (R. 170-171,f
10.)
2.

The trial court awarded Tamara alimony of $800 per month after the sale of

the marital home, and $1,008.31 until the home is sold, alimony terminable upon the

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR,
3 may contain errors.

i

death of either party, Tamara's remarriage or cohabitation, or until September 30, 2029,
whichever occurs sooner. (R. 212.)
3.

The trial court found that Tamara was underemployed, and for purposes of

alimony, imputed gross monthly income of $2,500 (R. 173) based on the following
findings:
a.

"Petitioner is currently employed as a reservation agent for Jet Blue

Airlines at a pay rate of approximately $10.00 per hour." (R. 170, ^f 12.)
b.

"Petitioner obtained this employment after a relatively minimal job search.

Other than positions at Jet Blue, petitioner applied for a number of research positions at
the University of Utah, a job at Hogle Zoo, and a job at a culinary store." (R. 170, ^f 13.)
c.

"The Court finds that Petitioner is underemployed based upon the

following:
"Petitioner commenced her current employment, as a reservation
agent for Jet Blue Airlines, in June of 2007;
"From approximately 1986 through 1990, the petitioner was
employed as a software engineer for Tecmag, Inc.;
"Through approximately 1999, petitioner worked occasionally as an
independent consultant;
"Petitioner is highly educated, having received her bachelor's degree
from Grinnell College in 1979, a masters degree from Rice
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University in 1986, and between 1979 and 1985, having attended the
Massachusetts Institute of Technology, and the University of North
Carolina, Chapel Hill;
"During the pendency of this action, the parties stipulated that Dr.
Kristie Farnsworth conduct an analysis of the petitioner's
employability;
"Dr. Farnsworth testified, and the Court finds, that based on the
current labor market, petitioner's immediate starting salary could be
expected to be between $29,830.00 and $32,480.00 annually;
"Dr. Farnsworth also testified, and the Court finds that if petitioner
upgraded her skills she could expect a starting salary ranging
between $46,370.00 and $58,400.00 annually; and
"Although petitioner has been out of the workplace for many years,
she has work skills, a high level of education, and is capable of
earning a greater income than she is currently earning.'" (R. 171 —
172,tl4(i)-14(viii).)
d.

"In determining the income that petitioner is capable of earning, the court

finds it is inappropriate to utilize the income petitioner is earning as a reservation agent,
as she does have the immediate ability, without upgrading her work skills, to earn greater
income. However, it is similarly inappropriate to awsird alimony based on skills and
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training which petitioner does not yet possess and will require significant time to obtain."
(R. 1734 15.)
e.

"Balancing both considerations, the Court finds it appropriate to impute

gross monthly income to petitioner of $2,500.00 per month, which is at the low range of
what Dr. Famsworth testified would be petitioner's immediate starting salary based upon
her current skills" (R. 173, T| 16.)
4.

The trial court found that Tamara had net monthly income of $3,962.13

based on the finding that "After reasonable monthly deductions of $375.00, petitioner has
net imputed income from employment of $2,125.00. The addition of the anticipated child
support in the amount of $1,582.70, and dividend income from petitioner's inheritance in
the amount of $254.43, provides petitioner with $3,962.13 to meet her monthly
expenses". (R. 173417.)
5.

In support of her claimed monthly expenses of$5,953.63, Tamara

submitted as Exhibit 7, a Financial Declaration. The trial court found that Tamara had
reasonable monthly expenses of $4,716.52 (R. 173) based on the following reductions to
the expenses Tamara claimed in Financial Declaration:
a.

"The mortgage payment was reduced to $2,000.00 per month, anticipating

that the house would be sold and that each party would wish to find new housing with a
payment of approximately that amount;" (R. 173 - 174, ^ 18(i).)
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b.

"The food and household expenses were reduced to $750.00 based upon the

Court's experience that a monthly amount of $250.00 is reasonable for each person
residing in the household;" (R. 174,118(ii).)
c.

"The telephone expense was reduced to $250.00 based upon the Court's

experience that the services can be provided for much less than petitioner is now paying;"
(R. 174,118(iii).)
d.

"The clothing allowance was reduced to $200.00;" (R. 174, Tf 18(iv).)

e.

"The amount set aside for school was reduced to $100.00, based on

testimony that the children are no longer enrolled in piano lessons;" (R. 174, ^ 18(v).)
f.

"Gifts and donations were reduced to $ 100.00;" (R. 174,1J18(vi).)

g.

"Auto expenses were reduced to $200.00;" (R. 174, % 18(vii)), and

h.

"The personal care and gym expenses were reduced to $100.00" (R. 173,

174,1fl8(viii).)
5.

The trial court found that "The shortfall between petitioner's available

income and her reasonable monthly living expense is $754.39, suggesting that petitioner
is in need of support". (R. 174, Tf 19.)
6.

David is a tenured professor of mathematics at the University of Utah. (R.

238 at 36.)

7
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7.

The trial court determined that David's gross monthly income was

$9,927.94. (R. 174-175, f 20.) After subtracting reasonable monthly deductions of
$2,949.22, his net available income was calculated to be $6,350.70. (R. 175, ^ 21.)
8.

<

The trial court disallowed one of David's items of monthly expenses

(installment payments of $630.13) on the basis that "no evidence was presented at trial
that allows the Court to determine the nature of this debt." (R. 175.)
9.

The court found David's reasonable monthly expenses to be $3,766.53. (R.

175,1f 22.) Adding child support of $1,582.70 to that amount left David with $5,349.23
in monthly obligations. (R. 175, ^ 23.) After subtracting David's net available income of
$6,350.70 from his monthly obligations of $5,349.23, David was left with disposable
income of $1,001.45, suggesting that requiring [David] to provide such support is
reasonable." (R. 176, If 23.)
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
I.

Tamara complains that the trial court's findings were insufficient to support

the trial court's imputation of income to her, and insufficient to support the trial court's
reduction of certain of her monthly living expenses. Tamara, in her brief, recognizes the
exceedingly strict two-pronged marshaling requirement of first, painstakingly detailing
the facts that support the trial court's findings, and then explaining why those findings are
insufficient. Although Tamara recognizes the two-pronged marshaling requirement, and
although Tamara does set forth the trial court's detailed findings, inexplicably Tamara
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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(

makes no effort to explain why the trial court's detailed findings are insufficient. Failure
to undertake the marshaling requirement leads to the presumption of correctness and
sufficiency of the trial court's findings and an affirmation of the trial court's ruling.
II.

Perhaps out of desperation, having already failed to marshal the evidence,

Tamara misrepresents the trial court's findings in support of the imputation of income.
The expert retained pursuant to stipulation testified as to a range of income Tamara could
earn utilizing her current skills, and the range of income she would earn if she received
additional training and education. Consistent with David's suggestion as set in his
proposed Findings of Fact, the trial court imputed income to Tamara based on income she
would generate using her current skills, not based upon earnings if she updated her skills
and received additional training. Further, the trial court imputed income from the lower
part of the range of income Tamara would earn based on her current skills. Despite the
clarity of the trial court's findings, Tamara pursues an argument against imputation based
on a misrepresentation, claiming the trial court based its imputation of income on
Tamara's expected earning if she upgraded her skills.
III.

Tamara's claim that the trial court should not have included child support

she receives as part of her income presents another oddity. Tamara included the
children's expenses as part of her expenses. Tamara failed to present any evidence to the
trial court of her expenses separate from those of the children. This was not a situation
where Tamara sought to present evidence of her expenses separate from those of the
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children but such evidence was not received by the trial court. Tamara made no effort to
segregate her expenses from those of the children. To the contrary, Tamara inflated her
expenses by including expenses of the children, some of which were not being incurred.
As Tamara steadfastly sought to increase her expenses by including the children's
expenses, it was proper for the trial court to include the child support she receives to
offset those expenses.
IV.

Tamara5s contention that the trial court erred in including the children's

expenses as part of her monthly expenses is a similarly inexplicable contention. Tamara
requested that the trial court consider the children's expenses as part of her total
expenses. Reduced to its essentials, Tamara's argument is that the trial court abused its
discretion by basing her need for alimony on the expenses she submitted which included
the children's expenses. Stated another way, Teimara contends it was error for the trial
court to consider the evidence she submitted.
V.

Tamara's claim that the trial court failed to calculate alimony after child

support terminates fails, as the trial court awarded Tamara sufficient alimony to eliminate
the gap between her monthly income and her monthly reasonable expenses as determined
by the trial court. As Tamara has received the maximum award possible, David's ability
once child support terminates is not a relevant consideration. Tamara's argument that the
trial court made a mathematic error in computing David's ability to pay income fails for
the same reason as the award of alimony completely erases the shortfall between
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Tamara's income and expenses; any ability to have paid greater amount of alimony is
irrelevant. Reduced to its essentials, Tamara's argument is that even though she had
received the maximum amount of alimony she could be awarded consistent with both
case and statutory law, quite simply, she wants more.
VI.

Tamara's argument that the trial court abused its discretion in failing to

award alimony sufficient to allow Tamara to enjoy the lifestyle of the marriage fails for
numerous reasons. Tamara's argument is built upon a foundation of income equalization
which pursuant to case law would be an abuse of discretion. Although not explicitly
stated, but strongly implied, Tamara's unsupported and inequitable argument is that the
trial court should have accepted Tamara's expenses without any reduction, without any
determination as to the reasonableness of those expenses, and without regard of David's
reasonable living expenses. Tamara fails to demonstrate her implied contention, that
there was sufficient income to provide for two households without reduction of monthly
living expenses.
VII.

Tamara's complaint that the findings are inadequate to support the eight (8)

reductions the trial court made to her claimed expenses fails, as the trial court more than
amply fulfilled its requirement of demonstrating and setting forth the reductions to
Tamara's expenses.
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ARGUMENT
I

I.

TAMARA HAS FAILED TO MARSHAL THE EVIDENCE.

Tamara contends that the trial court's findings were, one, inadequate to support the
reduction of her monthly expenses, and two, inadequate to support the trial court's
imputation of income to her. As Tamara challenges the sufficiency of the trial court's
findings, Tamara is obligated to "marshal all record evidence that supports the challenged
fmding(s)". Section 24(a)(9) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure.
In West Valley City v. Majestic Inv. Co., 818 P.2d 1311,1315 (Utah Ct. App.
1991), this Court provided a full detailed explanation of the strict requirements of the
marshaling process:
The marshaling process is not unlike becoming the devil's advocate.
Counsel must extricate himself or herself from the client's shoes and fully
assume the adversary's position. In order to properly discharge the duty of
marshaling the evidence, the challenger must present, in comprehensive and
fastidious order, every scrap of competent evidence introduced at trial
which supports the very findings the appellant resists. After constructing
this magnificent array of supporting evidence, the challenger must ferret out
a fatal flaw in the evidence. The gravity of this flaw must be sufficient to
convince the appellate court that the court's finding resting upon the
evidence is clearly erroneous. Id. at 1315.
As described in West Valley City, an appellant who challenges the sufficiency of
evidence is likened to a person seeking to demonstrate that there are missing pieces from
a jigsaw puzzle. Just as the dissatisfied puzzle purchaser must assemble all of the pieces
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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that were provided to demonstrate the absence of a complete puzzle, an appellant who
challenges the trial court's findings must demonstrate why all of the pieces of the
evidence do not support the trial court's findings.
Applying West Valley City to the case at hand, Tamara does make an effort to
fulfill the first part of the marshaling requirement. Tamara does make an attempt to list
all of the evidence supportive of the trial court's findings. Tamara fails in the second
step of the marshaling process, explaining why all of the evidence taken together does not
support the trial court's findings. Tamara does not even attempt to explain why the
evidence is insufficient to support the trial court's findings. Although Tamara complains
that the trial court's findings were insufficient, Tamara makes no attempt to explain why
the pieces of evidence, when assembled together, are insufficient to support the trial
court's findings. Tamara makes no effort to explain the fatal flaws in the evidence, and
what is needed to correct the flaws.
Tamara's first complaint is that the evidence was insufficient to support the trial
court's reduction of her monthly expenses. Other than making a statement declaring that
the findings were insufficient, Tamara makes absolutely no attempt to undertake the
second step of the marshaling requirement, explaining why the evidence is insufficient to
support the trial court's findings.
Tamara's second complaint as to the sufficiency of the trial court's findings is
found in section G., commencing on page 30, of her Brief, where Tamara claims the trial

13
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court abused its discretion by imputing income to her. The background of this issue is
that pursuant to stipulation, Dr. Kristie Famsworth was retained to perform a vocational
assessment of Tamarafs earning ability. (R. 57-59.) Dr. Famsworth testified at the trial. In
paragraphs 14 through 17, which are found on pages 6 and 7 of her Brief, Tamara sets
forth portions of Dr. Farnsworth's testimony, and the trial court's findings based on Dr.
Farnsworthfs testimony. Tamara makes absolutely no attempt, whatsoever, to explain
why the trial testimony and the findings based on evidence provided at trial by the
vocational expert, appointed by stipulation, and adopted by the trial court, are insufficient
to support the trial court's findings. Instead of undertaking the marshaling requirement of
ferreting out the fatal flaw in the evidence that the trial court did rely on, Tamara
contends that on the basis of other evidence, it was an abuse of discretion to impute
income to her. A statement that the trial court should have rejected certain evidence, and
should have put more weight upon other considerations, is argument. Tamara utterly fails
to even attempt the marshaling requirement of explaining why the evidence adduced at
trial is insufficient to support the court's findings.
In Moon v. Moon, 973 P.2d 431 (Utah Ct. App. 1999), this Court held that rearguing evidence does not fulfill the marshaling requirement, and failure to marshal
evidence leads to the presumption that the evidence was sufficient, and an affirmation of
the ruling of the trial court.:
When an appellant fails to meet the "heavy burden" of marshaling the
evidence, id (citation omitted), we "assume[] that the record supports the
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findings of the trial court," Wade v. Stangl, 869 P.2d 9, 12 (Utah Ct. App.
1994) (quoting Saunders v. Sharp. 806 P.2d 198, 199 (Utah 1991)). Here,
Mr. Moon simply re-argued his own evidence. Accordingly, because Mr.
Moon has failed to marshal the evidence supporting the trial court's
findings and then to show that the findings are unsupported, we affirm the
trial court's construction of the ambiguous alimony provision of the divorce
decree. Id. at 437.
As Tamara fails to undertake the strict marshaling requirement of explaining why
the evidence and findings are insufficient, the trial court's findings should be deemed
sufficient.
In Jensen v. Jensen, 197 P.3d 117, (Utah Ct. App. 2008) the appellant wife
contended that the trial court abused its discretion by imputing income to her. As the
lower court had made detailed findings as to the requesting spouse's employment history,
this Court affirmed the lower court's imputation of income and stated;
Wife argues that the trial court abused its discretion by imputing excessive
income to her and in determining her financial need. However, Wife fails
to marshal the evidence necessary to challenge these factual findings and
simply reargues the evidence she presented at trial. See Moon v. Moon,
1999 UT App 12,1J24, 973 P.2d 431. The trial court made detailed findings
regarding Wife's imputed income and her actual demonstrated need. The
court specifically noted that income was imputed to Wife based on her past
employment, which the court found to be a "benchmark" of her earning
potential ... Therefore, we conclude that the trial court's findings are
supported by the evidence and the trial court did not abuse its discretion by
imputing the income to Wife in excess of the minimum wage ... Id. at 121.
In the instant case, just as in Jensen, the trial court made detailed findings as to
Tamara's income earning potential. The trial court's detailed findings not only included
the evidence and testimony that the trial court based its findings upon, but also included

15
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the testimony and evidence the court did not adopt regarding Tamara's earning potential.
Just like the appellants in Moon and Jensen, Tamara's attempt to reargue from the
evidence, and her failure to undertake the marshaling requirement of explaining why the
evidence was insufficient to support the trial courts findings, should lead to an
affirmation of the trial court's findings.
II.

TAMARA MISREPRESENTS THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDINGS
SUPPORTIVE OF IMPUTATION OF INCOME.

Tamara fails to undertake the marshaling requirement of demonstrating why the
evidence in support of the imputation of income was insufficient to support the trial
court's findings. Tamara's failure to marshal the evidence should bar further
consideration of Tamara's arguments against the imputation of income. As David has
one opportunity to address this Court, David asks this Court to consider, that Tamara's
argument against the imputation of income rests upon a misrepresentation of the trial
court's findings. Tamara does not dispute the trial court's authority to impute income.
Tamara argues that the trial court abused its discretion by imputing income based on the
finding that to generate the income the trial court imputed to her, she would not have any
income at all, as she would have to stop working to obtain training and education to
update her earning potential. That argument misrepresents the findings of the trial court.
The trial court did not base its imputation of income upon skills that would require
education and training. The trial court based its imputation on skills Tamara currently
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possesses. Tamara accurately references on page 17, paragraph 15(a) and 15(b) of her
brief, that Dr. Farnsworth, the expert appointed by stipulation, testified as to Tamara's
expected earnings based on one, her current skills in the current market; and two,
Tamara's expected earnings, if she upgraded her skills. Dr. Farnsworth testified, and the
trial court found, that based on Tamara's current skills in the current market, Tamara's
starting salary would be between $29,830 and $32,480 annually. (R. 172, ^ 1 l(vi-vii).)
Dr. Farnsworth also testified that if Tamara upgraded her skills, her starting salary would
be between $46,370 and $58,400 annually. (R. 172, «f 1 l(vi-vii).) As Tamara references
in paragraphs 16 and 17, on page 17 and 18 of her Brief, the trial court did not impute
income based on Dr. Famsworth's testimony as to Tamara's expected earnings if she
upgraded her skills. The trial court imputed income to Tamara based on Dr. Famsworth's
testimony as to Tamara's earnings based on her current skills in the current market. Not
only did the trial court base its imputation of income based on Tamara's current skills,
but the trial court utilized the income from the lower range of expected income based on
Tamara's current skills. In her zeal to reargue the evidence before this Court, Tamara
misrepresents the basis of the trial court's findings in support of the imputation of
income.

III.

AS TAMARA INCLUDED THE CHILDREN'S EXPENSES AS PART OF

HER MONTHLY EXPENSES, CHILD SUPPORT WAS PROPERLY INCLUDED
AS PART OF TAMARA'S INCOME.

17
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Section 30-3-5 (8)(a) U.C.A. sets forth a non-exclusive list of the factors the trial
court is to consider in determining alimony. The first of these factors is "the financial
condition and needs of the recipient spouse". In practicality, the recipient spouse's need
for alimony is determined by subtracting the recipient spouse's monthly income from the
recipient spouse's monthly expenses.
Tamara contends the trial court abused its discretion by including the childsupport she receives as part of her monthly income. Tamara neglects to mention that she
sought to increase her monthly expenses by including the expenses of the children as part
of her monthly expenses. In support of her monthly expenses, Tamara submitted a
Financial Declaration in which she set forth her claimed monthly expenses. (Petitioner's
Exhibit 7, R. 174 ^f 18.), It is undisputed that Tamara's claimed monthly expenses
included the children's expenses. Tamara was so zealous in seeking to increase her
expenses, she claimed expenses related to the children that were not actually being
incurred, such as piano lessons. (R. 174, f 18(v).) The record, and Tamara's Brief as
well, are devoid of any reference to evidence of Tamara's monthly expenses, separate
from those of the children. Tamara sought to increase her monthly expenses, and thereby
increase her need for alimony by including the children's expenses. The result Tamara
seeks is that she should be allowed to increase her monthly expenses, and her need for
alimony by including the children's expenses as part of her monthly expenses, yet her
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income should not include the support she receives from David, to offset the children's
expenses.
Tamara references the case of Williamson v. Williamson, 983 P.2d 1103 (Utah Ct.
App 1999), for the contention that child-support "should not be considered as income for
purposes of calculating alimony". There is a distinct difference between Williamson and
the case at hand. From the Williamson decision, it is not possible to determine if in
Williamson, which addresses a modification of child support and alimony, whether the
requesting spouse, Ms. Williamson, included the children's expenses as part of her
monthly expenses. In the instant case, Tamara contends that it was error to include the
income she receives as child-support, yet she included the children's expenses as part of
her monthly expenses. If Tamara sought a determination of her need for alimony that did
not include child-support, Tamara should have, but failed, to produce evidence as to her
monthly expenses separate from those of the children.
IV.

TAMARA CANNOT CLAIM THE COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION

BY INCLUDING THE CHILDREN'S EXPENSES AS PART OF HER MONTHLY
EXPENSES WHEN TAMARA'S MONTHLY BUDGET INCLUDED THE
CHILDREN'S EXPENSES.
On page 22 of her brief, Tamara states that "the court's combining of Tamara's
expenses with those of the children skewed the court's calculation of Tamara's needs."
Tamara again overlooks that she asked the trial court to consider the children's expenses
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as part of her own expenses in making an alimony determination. Tamara failed to
present any evidence of her expenses separate from those of the children. Tamara cannot
claim that the trial court did not adequately consider her expenses separate from those of
the children, as Tamara failed to present any such evidence.
In support of her contention that inclusion of the childrenfs expenses led to a
miscalculation of her monthly needs, Tamara presents several arguments. Tamara does
not maintain that the trial court wrongfully excluded evidence, or failed to consider
evidence that was received by the trial court. One of Tamara's arguments, found on page
23 of her Brief, states, "the court seemed to be quite aggressive in reducing Tamara's
expenses". Tamara's subjective opinion is not a proper subject of appellate review. The
question isn't whether the trial court was "aggressive". The issue Tamara raises on
appeal is whether there was sufficient evidence to support the trial court's findings.
Tamara, who has invoked appellate court review, has the obligation to demonstrate why
the trial court abused its discretion in reducing her expenses. Tamara does not attempt to
fulfill that obligation, but instead seeks to re-argue the evidence. In Jensen this court
took issue with a litigant who "fails to marshal the evidence necessary to challenge these
factual findings and simply re-argues the evidence she presented at trial". See Jensen, Id.
at 121. At least in Jensen, the offending litigant re-argued evidence presented at trial.
Tamara seeks to re-argue the case based on her complaint that the trial court abused its
discretion by failing to consider evidence that Tamara made no effort to introduce.
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Tamara's attempt to re-argue the evidence includes a mathematical calculation.
Tamara contends that it was error for the trial court not to determine that the parties have
equal monthly needs. Underlying Tamara's approach is the contention that both parties
should be determined to have the same monthly expenses, and that alimony should be
awarded so that both parties have the same monthly income. Tamara's approach is one
of income equalization. A difficulty with Tamara's approach is that income equalization
is an abuse of discretion. In Jensen, this Court held, "simply 'attempting to equalize the
parties' incomes, rather than going through the traditional needs analysis' is an abuse of
discretion". Jensen, id. at 122.
Tamara's mathematic argument is founded upon a misstatement. The trial court
did not find that Tamara's monthly expenses exclusive of the children's expenses were
$3,133. This figure is nothing more than a supposition introduced by Tamara on appeal,
in support of her argument that the trial court was "aggressive" in reducing her monthly
expenses. Tamara's mathematic argument, based on a misstatement, does not
camouflage Tamara's failure to present evidence as to her monthly expenses exclusive of
the children. To the contrary, Tamara's tactic at trial was to increase her monthly
expenses by including the children's expenses, even expenses that were not actually
incurred.
As part of her mathematic argument, Tamara complains it was inequitable that the
trial court found David's reasonable monthly expenses to be $3,766.53 and found

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

21

Tamara's expenses to be $3,133.82. This complaint is devoid of any support that a trial
court abused its discretion by failing to find that the parties have equal monthly expenses.
While pursuant to 30-3-5 U.C.A., a trial court may ultimately award alimony so as to
equalize the parties' standard of living, Tamara fails to present any authority that the trial
court must find that both parties have the same monthly living expenses.
V.

IT WAS NOT AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION TO FAIL TO CALCULATE
DAVID'S ABILITY TO PAY ALIMONY AFTER CHILD-SUPPORT
TERMINATES AS THE ALIMONY AWARDED CONSTITUTES THE
MAXIMUM PERMISSIBLE ALIMONY AWARD.
In Jensen, this court held that an award of alimony cannot be greater than the

financial shortfall between the requesting spousefs monthly expenses and the requesting
spouse's income:
" . . . Regardless of the payor spouse's ability to pay more, '"the [recipient]
spouse's demonstrated need must. . . constitute the maximum permissible alimony
award.'" (see Bingham v. Bingham, 870 P.2d. 1065 (Utah Ct. App 1994))". Id. at 122.
In the instant case, the trial court found that Tamara had a shortfall between her
reasonable monthly expenses of $4,716.52, and her household income of $3,962.13 (the
household income consisting of imputed income of $2,125, child-support of $1,582.70
and dividend income of $254.43), of $754.39. (R. 173, \ 17, 18; 174, \ 19.) The trial
court's award of alimony of $800 per month actually exceeds Tamara's need for alimony.
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Applying the holding of Jensen to the instant case, the trial court did not commit
an abuse of discretion, or any error whatsoever, in declining to speculate as to David's
ability to pay alimony when his child-support obligation terminates. The alimony award
of $800 slightly exceeds the maximum permissible alimony award. As the alimony
awarded does completely erase the shortfall between Tamarafs income and expenses,
there is no reason to consider David's ability to pay alimony when there is no longer
child-support obligation.
VI.

THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN FAILING

TO AWARD ALIMONY SUFFICIENT TO ALLOW TAMARA TO ENJOY THE
LIFESTYLE OF THE MARRIAGE.
Tamara's contention that the trial court abused its discretion in failing to award
alimony in an amount sufficient for her to maintain the lifestyle of the marriage is based
on an erroneous interpretation of the decision in Richardson v. Richardson, 201 P.3d 942
(Utah Ct. App. 2008). In Richardson, this court set forth the often repeated three
purposes of alimony: " ( 1 ) t o g e t the parties as close as possible to the same standard of
living that existed during the marriage; (2) to equalize the standard of living of each
party; and (3) to prevent the recipient spouse from becoming a public charge." The
above-cited purposes, which are viewed as three different goals, will apply in different
circumstances. There will be circumstances when there is sufficient income for both
parties to maintain the lifestyle of the marriage, and in cases where the parties have lived
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beyond their means; or where there is insufficient income for both parties to maintain the
lifestyle of the marriage, the purpose, or goal would be to equalize the standard of living
of each party. In other cases, the goal would be alimony sufficient to prevent the
recipient from relying on public support.
There is no requirement in Richardson, or in any other case Tamara presents,
holding that it is error for a trial court to award alimony insufficient for one of the
spouses to maintain the lifestyle of the marriage. While Richardson establishes the goals
of alimony, §30-3-5(8)(a) U.C.A. sets forth the factors that the court is to consider in
achieving those goals. As long as the factors in §30-3-5(8)(a) have been considered, the
trial court's alimony award is not to be disturbed absent a clear abuse of discretion.
Griffith v. Griffith, 959 P.2d 1018 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). Despite Tamara's unsupported
contention to the contrary, there is no requirement that an alimony award must allow the
recipient spouse to maintain the lifestyle of the marriage, and as Tamara acknowledges
that the trial court did consider the factors of 30-3-5(8)(a), the trial court's award of
alimony was not an abuse of discretion and as set forth above, does not result in a serious
inequity.
Tamara's contention that it was abuse of discretion that she was not awarded
alimony in an amount that would allow her to maintain the lifestyle of the marriage also
fails, due to a failure to marshal the evidence. What Tamara is really claiming is that the
Court should merely have accepted her claimed expenses, without reduction, and then
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simply awarded her alimony in an amount sufficient to pay those expenses. As Tamara
makes that argument, Tamara has the serious responsibility of demonstrating that the
evidence before the trial court was that there was sufficient income to allow both parties
to continue to enjoy the lifestyle of the marriage. Tamara fails to even attempt to explain
that the evidence presented at trial was sufficient to demonstrate the existence of enough
income to allow both parties to maintain the lifestyle of the marriage. Not explicitly
stated, but implied in Tamara's contention that alimony should have been awarded to her
in an amount sufficient to maintain the lifestyle of the marriage, are the contentions that
the trial court should not have considered David's reasonable expenses, or David's ability
to pay. Tamara's implied argument is that the trial court abused its discretion by
reducing her expenses, which the trial court should have accepted at face value, and
abused its discretion in considering David's expenses, as according to Tamara it was an
abuse of discretion for her not to receive alimony in an amount sufficient for her to
maintain the lifestyle of the marriage.
VII. ANY MATHEMATIC ERROR AS TO DAVID'S DISPOSABLE INCOME
IS HARMLESS.
Tamara contends that the trial court made a mathematical subtraction error in
computing David's disposable income. In support of her claim Tamara references the
Court's opinion in State v. Holgate, 2000 UT 74,111, 10 P.3d 346, which holds that an

25

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

error is harmful if, "absent the error, 'there is a reasonable likelihood of a more favorable
outcome for the appellant."5 (see State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201 at 1208-09, Utah 1993).
In the instant case, any mathematic error is harmless. The court awarded alimony
of $800 per month is slightly more than the shortfall between Tamarafs income and
expenses. As the award of alimony fills that gap between Tamara's monthly expenses and
income, as referenced by the court in Jensen, the award of alimony is the maximum
permissible award, regardless of whether David has greater disposable income. As an
increase in David!s disposable income cannot result in an increase in alimony, pursuant to
Holgate, any error is harmless and not subject to further review.
VIII. THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDINGS ADEQUATELY SUPPORT THE
REDUCTION OF TAMARA'S MONTHLY EXPENSES.
Tamara references Riley v. Riley, 138 P.3d 84 (Utah App. 2006), for the
proposition that a trial court's alimony determination must include a consideration of the
factors of 30-3-5(8)(a). The factors set forth in 30-3-5(8)(a) are a codification of what
were previously known as the "Jones factors", those factors include consideration of "the
financial condition and needs of the recipient spouse".
In Willey v. Willey, 951 P.2d 226 (Utah 1997), the Utah Supreme Court recognized
that the manner in which a party proves their monthly living expenses is to submit a
statement setting forth their specific monthly expenses, and by providing further evidence
that supports the claimed expenses.
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In domestic relations cases, the parties commonly submit statements of
assets and expenses as exhibits. Trial courts also commonly accept into
evidence exhibits constituting that party's claims without objection.
However, this procedure does not necessarily obviate the need for further
evidence in support of some items listed on the exhibit. Generally, there is
further questioning of certain items contained in the exhibit as to value.
Trial judges commonly accept, modify, reduce or reject claimed items in
such exhibits, depending upon the item and according to the evidence or the
lack thereof. Thus, it is incumbent upon a party to submit supporting
evidence to prove the value of the claimed property or claimed expense to
avoid the risk that the trial judge will reduce or reject the value of a
particular item. This is especially true where the value of the item appears
out of the ordinary. The trial court is not required to accept each item of
expense as a proven fact just because it receives a statement of expenses
into evidence. Id. at 231.
The case of Andrus v. Andrus, 169 P.3d. 754 (Utah App. 2007) instructs that in
addition to making an overall finding of each party's total living expenses, the findings
must "disclose the steps by which the ultimate conclusion on each factual issue is
reached". Id. at 759.
The Andrus decision is notable for not just what is required (a disclosure of the
underlying reductions, increases or acceptance of the proposed expense), but also for
what isn't required. The Andrus decision does not require that the trial court make a
specific finding of the reason why the court accepted, reduced or increased each claimed
expense. All that is required is that the finding be sufficiently specific so that the
reviewing court can make a determination as to what reduction the trial court did make
regarding each expense. In the instant case, the trial court amply fulfilled the requirement
of Willey and Andrus. Paragraph 18 of the trial court's Findings states that the court
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determined that Tamara's monthly expenses were $4,716.52 considering the monthly
expenses Tamara set forth in her exhibit 7, which was her Financial Declaration.
Continuing in subparagraphs 18(i) through 18(viii), the trial court set forth the eight
specific reductions to Tamara's claimed expenses. On four of those expenses, the court
set forth the reasoning behind the reductions. On four of the expenses, the court set forth
the reduction, but not the reasoning. Consistent with the Andrus decision, the trial court
fulfilled its requirement by detailing the expenses that were reduced.
Tamara's Financial Declaration set forth sixteen (16) expenses. As was stated
above, the trial court reduced eight of those expenses, and accepted eight of the expenses
as claimed. (R. 173 - 174, Tf 18 (i) - 18(viii).) It is implied, without any further finding,
that the trial court accepted the non-reduced expenses as reasonable. No further finding
was necessary regarding the non-reduced findings. Similarly, although the trial court did
not provide its reasoning for reducing 4 of the 8 expenses it did reduce, even though no
specific reasoning was required, it was not necessary for the court to provide its
reasoning for the four expenses it reduced without further explanation.
Tamara relies on Willey v. Willey 914 P.2d 1149 (Utah App. 1996) to support her
contention that there must be adequate findings as to reduced expenses, and those
adequate findings must include the trial court's reasoning for reducing or accepting each
claimed monthly expense. The decision in Willey has no precedential impact for the case
at hand. First, although mistakenly so, the Court of Appeals understood that the parties'
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living expenses were not an issue as the parties had stipulated to their monthly expenses.
No evidence was submitted regarding these expenses as they had been stipulated, yet
without the benefit of any evidence the trial court reduced them. In the instant case,
Tamara's expenses were an issue, and the trial court considered the parties' testimony
regarding Tamara's claimed expenses. Secondly, the Willey case that Tamara relies upon
was reversed by the Utah Supreme Court in Willey v. Willey, 951 P.2d 226(Utah 1997).
Summarizing, the Court of Appeals increased Ms. Willey's monthly expenses based on
the Court of Appeals understanding that without any evidence being submitted the trial
court had reduced Ms. Willey's monthly expenses even though Mr. and Ms. Willey had
stipulated to their monthly expenses. The Utah Supreme Court, in its reversal of the Utah
Court of Appeals Willey decision, based its determination on that the Court of Appeals
had erroneously substituted its judgment for that of the trial court. The Utah Supreme
Court did not remand the issue of Ms. Willey's expenses back to the trial court for
additional findings. The Utah Supreme Court did not find the reductions to Ms. Willey's
expenses to be based on insufficient findings. Instead, the Supreme Court gave credence
to the determination and judgment of the trial court in its production of Ms. Willey's
expenses. Similarly, as the trial court's findings specifically set forth the reductions to
Tamara's expenses, the trial court has amply fulfilled its requirement to indicate the
expenses that have been reduced.
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CONCLUSION
The Appellee requests that the trial court's decision be affirmed.

DATED this cP^favof

fifM^'

2010.

SKORDAS, GASTQN & HYDE, LLC
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ADDENDUM
1. Addendum Table of Contents: Trial Exhibit 7, Petitioner's Financial
Declaration dated July 13,2009.
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Randy S.Ludlow #2011
Attorney for Petitioner
185 South State Street, Suite 208
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 531-1300
Fax: (801) 328-0173

In the Third Judicial District Court of Salt Lake County
STATE OF UTAH

FINANCIAL DECLARATION

TAMARA TURNER DOBSON,
Petitioner,

Civil No. 084903358
vs.

Judge Anthony Quinn
Comm. T. Patrick Casey

DAVID C. DOBSON,
Respondent.

Name: Tamara Turner Dobson
Address: 4473 Abinadi Road
Salt Lake City, Utah 84124
Soc. Sec. No.: XXX-XX-1639
Occupation: Reservation Agent
Employer: Jet Blue Airways
Employer Address: P.O. Box 17435
Salt Lake City, Utah 84117
Number of exemptions claimed: 4
Birthdate: November 16,1956

STATEMENT OF INCOME, EXPENSES, ASSETS & LIABILITIES
1.

GROSS MONTHLY INCOME from:

Salary and wages, including commissions,
bonuses, overtime and allowances

$1,766.35

Pensions and retirement

$-0-

1 Social security

$-0-

s-o-

Disability and unemployment insurance
-1-
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1 Public assistant (welfare, AFDC payment, etc.)

$-0-

| Child support from any prior marriage

$-0-

Dividends and interest

$254.43

Rents

$-0-

All other sources: (Specify)

$-0-

I

TOTAL MONTHLY INCOME

$2,020.78

j

2.

MONTHLY DEDUCTIONS:

Federal income tax

$18.46

State income tax

$30.94

FICA

$123.53

Health insurance (Medical, Dental, Vision, & LTD; Tamara only)

$100.49

Life insurance

$-0-

|

$-0-

|

$-0-

|

$123.63

|

Savings plan

$-0-

|

Credit union

$-0-

1

Other (specify)

$-0-

|

Other (specify)

$-0-

1

TOTAL MONTHLY DEDUCTIONS

$397.05

1

| Union or other dues
Retirement or pension fund
401(k)

3.

(Roth post-tax)

NET MONTHLY INCOME:

(Attach YTD pay stub and prior year W-2/tax return)

4.

$1,623.73

DEBTS AND OBLIGATIONS:

Creditor's Name

Purpose of debt

In whose name

Balance

Monthly
Payment

NONE

$

$

TOTAL

$-0-

$-0-

-2-
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PROPERTY:
(a)

Real estate (if more than one parcel of real estate, attach sheet with
identical information)
Address

4473 Abinadi Road
Salt Lake City, Utah 84124

Date of acquisition

Approx. fall of 2001

'

Original Cost

$300,000,004-

'

Mortgage balance

$221,147.42

Mortgage holder

Chase Home Financial

Monthly payment

$1,803.96
2nd Mrtg.

| Other Liens:
Lienholder

Chase Home Financial

Monthly payment

$404.35

Current value

$Unknown

Basis of valuation
2nd Mrtg. Balance
(b)

(c)

$53,003.05

J

Vehicles
Year

Make

Model

Value

Bal. Owed

2001

Toyota

Sequoia (Tarnara)

$Unknown

$-0-

12002

Subaru

Outback (David)

SUnknown

$Unknown

2008

Honda 919

Motorcycle (David)

SUnknown

$Unknown

1996

Subaru

Impreza (Halina)

$Unknown

$-0-

1965

Ford

Mustang (David)

$Unknown

$-0-

Cash and deposit accounts (banks, savings &
loans, credit union-savings and checking)
Name of Institution

Type of
Account

Account No.

Current
Balance

JP Morgan Chase (Tamara)

Checking

xxxxx9225

$467.63
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(d)

JP Morgan Chase (Tamara)

Savings

xxxxxx4066

$2,430.51

JP Morgan Chase (Tamara)

Checking

xxxxxx0796

$447.47

Securities, stocks, bonds, money
market funds (other)
Name of Institution

Account No,

Current Value

1 JP Morgan Chase (Tamara)

xxxxxx8545.

$118,103.10

J INTEL (Tamara)

xxxxxxx3226

$1,487.43

1

J 3M (Tamara)

xxxxxx7140

$619.46

1

J JP Morgan Chase (Halina)

xxxxx7883

$136,414.63

I

JP Morgan Chase (Lara)

xxxxx7875

$64,021.59

J

JP Morgan Chase (Kalinda)

xxxxx7867

$15,449.20

1

Intel (Halina)

xxxxxx3242

$4,948.47

1

Intel (Lara)

xxxxxx3269

$4,946.47

J

xxxxxx3251

$4,948.18

1

1 Intel (Kalinda)
Charles Schwab (Halina)

xxxx3795

1 $16,324.85

J

Charles Schwab (Lara)

xxxx4413

$15,862.16

|

Charles Schwab (Kalinda)

xxxx9783

$15,036.33

J

1000

xxxxxx478EE

$Unknown

1000

xxxxxx480EE | $Unknown

1000

xxxxxx939EE

$Unknown

1000

xxxxxx517EE

$Unknown

1000

xxxxxx941EE

$Unknown

EE Bonds (Halina)

1000 1 xxxxxx942EE | $Unknown
$Unknown

500

xxxxxx722EE

1000

xxxxxx480EEj $Unknown

1000

xxxxxx994EE J $Unknown

500

xxxxxx496EE

5000 J xxxxx753EE
-4-

$Unknown
| $Unknown
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|

500

SUnknown

Shares

Current Value

Business interests

(e!

1 Name of business
| NONE

S_______________

_

Other assets (include value or equity)

(f)

6.

xxxxxx497EE

Asset(s)

Value/Equity

NONE

$

PROFIT SHARING OF RETIREMENT ACCOUNTS:
(If more than two accounts, attach sheet with identical information)

Account #1
i Name of company/plan name

TIAA CREF

Plan representative

University of Utah 401 (a) DC Plan

Address

730 Third Avenue, NYC, NY 10017-3206

Current value

$122,475.77 (as of 12-31-2007); (current, Unknown)

Account #2
Name of company/plan name

Fidelity

i

Plan representative

Texas A&M University System

i

Address

P.O. Box 770002, Cincinnati, OH 45277-0090

| Current value

$171,724.80 (as of 9-30-2007); (current, Unknown)

Account #3
Name of company/plan name

T Rowe Price

Plan representative

JetBlue Airways Retirement Plan

1 Address

4555 Painters Mill Road, Owings Mills, MD 21117

I Current value

$2,327.01
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'

7.

LIFE INSURANCE:

Name of Company

Policy No.

Face Amount

Cash Value
(if any)

Minnesota Life (Tamara)

xx633-6

$19,000.00

SUnknown

Unknown (David)

Unknown

SUnknown

SUnknown

8.

1

MONTHLY EXPENSES:
(1 st & 2nd Mrtgs.)

J Rent or mortgage payments (residence)

$2,208.31

1 Real property taxes (residence)

$included in mrtg.

Real property insurance (residence)

$included in mrtg.

Maintenance (residence)

$123.99

Food and household supplies

$1,013.42

j

Electricity

$82.88

1

Natural gas

$118.63

Water

$35.62

Sewer

$included w/water

Garbage

$included w/water

I

Telephone (Verizon cell phones $96.83; Home $81.40; Comcast
cable & internet $185.45)

$363.68

1

Laundry and dry cleaning

$included w/householdj

Clothing

$256.97

1

$483.99

j

1 Utilities:

Medical

(Prescriptions & Co-pays)

1

$Unknown

Dental (and Orthodontics)
Insurance (life, accident, comprehensive, liability, disability,
excluding deductions from wages in item 2 above)

j

$-0-

j

Child care

| $-0-

|

Payment of child support or alimony from prior marriage

|

$-0-

1

School

(Registration, fees, lunches, piano lessons) | $171.79

$60.00

Entertainment

-6-
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J

$270.00

Gifts and donations
Transportation
Auto expense

(Auto insurance for Tamara)
(Gas $140.00; Maintenance, tires, registration $225.00)

$45.00
$365.00

Auto payments

$-0-

Installment payments (from item 4 above, not including above)

$-0-

Other expenses (specify)

(Personal care and the gym)

$287.94

Other expenses (specify)

(Pet care, food and supplies)

$66.41

TOTAL MONTHLY EXPENSES
STATE OF UTAH

)

County of Salt Lake

)

•

1

$5,953.63

I swear that all of the information contained herein is true and correct.

Affiant

Subscribed and sworn to before me this l^ciay of ^UMA/
~ Notary P u ^ . ! T 1
SHARLA J. WEAVER I
648 West 800 North, #35
Clinton, Utah 64015
My Ccmnwttton Explms
May 13,2011

State of UtEh

g
I
n
§

_ .

7
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, 2009.

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on this _ I 3 ^ day of July, 2009,1 caused to be HAND
DELIVERED, a true and correct copy of the foregoing FINANCIAL DECLARATION to the
following:
Harry Caston
341 South Main Street, #303
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

(t.T—

^aver
Legal Assistant

(
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